Poodle and Pound

October 24th, 2014 by

Earlier this week, we wrote about the POODLE security vulnerability. As as result of this, we’ve been working with our customers to disable SSLv3 support from their SSL/TLS services.

At Mythic Beasts, we use Pound as a load balancer fairly extensively. It’s free, secure, fairly quick and easy to configure. Unfortunately, it didn’t have a configuration option to disable SSLv3.

Image courtesy of SOMMAI at FreeDigitalPhotos.net

Image courtesy of SOMMAI at FreeDigitalPhotos.net

One of the advantages of hosting on open source software is that we’re not at the mercy of a vendor for software updates, so we took a patch which adds the ability to disable SSLv3, added it to the standard Debian package and made it available to our managed customers through our private package repository.

This same package is now in Debian unstable and is working its way into the Debian security and backports repositories. This is made easier because the Debian pound maintainer, Brett Parker, works for Mythic Beasts and wrote the technical details on his blog.

As we have a number of customers using pound on CentOS, we have also created patched versions of CentOS packages of Pound, and raised a ticket With Fedora in order to get this into the stable build.

POODLE: The cute, fluffy SSL vulnerability

October 20th, 2014 by
He's responsible for your SSL vulnerabilities. Photo credit: Greg Westfall, Flickr. CC-BY.

He’s responsible for your SSL vulnerabilities. Photo credit: Greg Westfall, Flickr, CC-BY.

SSL (or more accurately, its successor, TLS) is the technology used to keep your sensitive information, such as credit card details, secure. When you see the green padlock in your address bar, you know that your connection is safe from eavesdroppers. Or is it? Google have published details of a vulnerability in SSLv3. The vulnerability shouldn’t be an issue because SSLv3 has been almost completely replaced by TLS, but some implementations of TLS allow a “secure” connection to be downgraded to SSLv3.

When a computer connects to a secure service, such as an HTTPS website, the two sides will negotiate the version of the protocol to be used (a “handshake”). A server will initially offer a handshake using the strongest security it and the client are capable of. If the client does not respond correctly – for example because the client was incorrectly detected (and therefore is incapable of using that level of security), or because of a network glitch, the server will offer progressively weaker handshakes, until SSLv3 is used. This means that an active attacker could tamper with the SSL handshake using a man in the middle attack until it degrades to SSLv3.

At this time1, the best way to avoid this vulnerability is to disable support for SSLv3, both client-side and server-side. Systems administrators should disable SSLv3 by updating their server configuration, although note that in doing so you will prevent access from some very old platforms, most notably IE6 on Windows XP, which don’t support TLS.  End users should update their web browsers, as vendors are releasing new versions which disable SSLv3. If you’re still using IE6 on Windows XP and didn’t already have enough good reasons to upgrade, then this is another very good one.

Managed customers will have received an email from us, offering to make the necessary configuration changes to disable SSLv3. We would normally immediately apply a security patch, but as this breaks Windows XP / Internet Explorer 6 support we’ll wait for confirmation before applying it.

If you’re not a managed customer, add the following line to your Apache configuration file:

SSLProtocol All -SSLv2 -SSLv3

If you’re using Nginx, add:

ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2;

While dealing with SSLv3, it’s a good idea to run an SSL test using Qualys SSL Labs – this will check things like lack of SSL2 support (vulnerable since 1995), using SHA256, TLS 1.2 support, and support for perfect forward secrecy, among other things.

If this all sounds too complicated, it may be worth considering our management service. We’ll apply security patches for you, as well as monitoring your application and intervening if necessary, providing graphing and backups, and checking the health of your hard disks.


1 – TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV is an alternative fix, however at the moment server support is poor. However, a strong advantage of enabling it is that “fallback” attacks will be prevented in the future – allowing clients to use weaker security is rarely a good idea.

Shell Shock 2: The AfterShock

September 26th, 2014 by

As has been widely reported, a very major vulnerability in the bash shell was announced a couple of days ago (the event has been dubbed “Shell Shock” by the media). Sadly, the first set of updates released were insufficient to close the hole completely (“AfterShock” is the catchy name). Further updates were released late last night. These have been applied to all Mythic Beasts internal servers, and all managed customer servers.

Customers with unmanaged servers are urged to apply this second set of updates as quickly as possible.

So far, Apple have not released any updates for OS X. The version of bash distributed with OS X is demonstrably vulnerable to the security bug, so no doubt updates will be forthcoming. In the mean time, one possibility is to build bash from source; instructions for doing so can be found on the Internet.

Security issue in bash

September 24th, 2014 by

We’ve just become aware of a potentially very serious security hole in bash which is potentially remotely executable.

https://securityblog.redhat.com/2014/09/24/bash-specially-crafted-environment-variables-code-injection-attack/

Whilst we don’t have enough details yet to evaluate the seriousness of this we’ve already applied the fixes to our administration servers and VPN gateways, and are now looking at rolling out the updates to all affected managed customers. Managed customers should expect an email shortly with further details.

SSL certificates: SHA-1 deprecation

September 16th, 2014 by

We’ve been asked a few times recently about the announcement from the developers of the  Chrome browser concerning SHA-1 deprecation. This post gives some background, and answers the most common questions. If you’re in a hurry: don’t panic! Mythic Beasts has got you covered.

What’s it all about? For an SSL certificate to be trusted by browsers around the world, it needs to be digitally signed by a well-known and trusted body, called a Certification Authority or CA. (For the SSL certificates that we sell, the CA is usually GeoTrust.) When a certificate is issued, the CA takes the details of your certificate (most notably the address of your website, and the public half of your crypto key) and digitally signs them. When a user browses to your site, they receive your signed certificate and they check the CA’s signature of it to be certain that they are talking securely to the right site.

Except… the CA doesn’t actually sign all the data in the certificate. It first passes it through a cryptographic hash function, which securely reduces the data to a small fingerprint, and then it signs that. Currently, the hash function most commonly used in SSL certificates is SHA-1. This is going to change over the next couple of years.

What’s wrong with SHA-1? Cryptographic hash functions become weaker over time, as Moore’s law makes computers ever faster, and cryptologists discover flaws in the algorithm. A significant flaw in SHA-1 was first published back in 2005, and it is now believed that it may be feasible to find a SHA-1 collision by 2018 or sooner.

Is there an alternative? Yes! SHA-2 (also known as SHA-256) is already implemented in all major browsers. However, because of the nature of the problem, every SSL certificate needs to be upgraded, so we can tell browsers to stop accepting SHA-1 signed certificates. Note that SHA-1 has not yet been “broken”, and while weakened, it is still strong enough for the time being. However, for a smooth transition to SHA-2, we need to start now.

What’s the Google announcement? Although this has generated a lot of discussion, it doesn’t actually say very much that’s new. Microsoft announced in November 2013 that they will not accept SHA-1 signed certificates after 2016. The Chrome developers have recently confirmed that they will do the same, and have filled in some details for a hopefully smooth transition.

Rather than having a single cut-off date, Chrome will be gradually ratcheting up the level of warnings. SHA-1 certificates with an expiry date in 2017 or later will start to receive the “yellow triangle” warning in the browser address later this year. Of course, the connection is still encrypted, but this is a clear indication to users, and hopefully the site administrators too, that something is amiss.

yellow-triangle

By the middle of next year, if those sites are still running with a SHA-1 certificate that lasts into 2017, the warning will be upgraded to a red cross, making it crystal clear to all concerned that action is needed.

red-cross

For SHA-1 certificates that have an expiry date in 2016, the situation is not so serious. Sites with these certificates will start to receive yellow triangle warnings next year, but the warning won’t be escalated beyond that. In both cases, only the security icon will be changed; there will be no click-through warnings. This move, which is also supported by Mozilla and Opera, is forcing the hand of the CAs, and much misinformation has been spread about it.

Is my certificate OK? Yes. Almost all* certificates issued by Mythic Beasts have only a 1 year expiry, so your current certificate will not solicit any warnings from Chrome, or any other browser. *Very occasionally we do issue certificates for longer than 1 year; we’ve checked the issue dates for all these, and are in contact with all affected customers to reissue their certificates.

And then…? We already have a process in place for issuing SHA-2 certificates and renewals. It’s currently a bit more fiddly than we’d like (in fact, it involves obtaining a SHA-1 certificate and then reissuing it as SHA-2!), but we will be trying to make this slicker over the next few weeks. In any case, after October 2014, we will only be issuing SHA-2 certificates.